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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE 0'F UTAH 
~IICHAEL V. MALONEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellamt, 
-vs.-
SALT LAKE CITY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7926 
Appellant's Brief 
This is an action to recover damages for personal 
injuries suffered when a section of the city sidewalk 
collapsed, causing the Appellant to fall. The case was 
tried to a jury. The verdict was in favor of the plaintiff. 
However, the court nullified the verdict by granting the 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and the 
plaintiff appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The accident in question happened at approximately 
105 East South Temple Street, in front of the Eagle 
Gate Apartments. This is on the north side of South 
Temple just a short distance east of the intersection of 
South Temple and State Street. At this point the rity 
maintains a sidewalk which runs east and west. Parallel 
to the city walk and adjoining it on the north the Eagle 
Gate Apartments maintain a strip of concrete. A section 
of the city sidewalk was fissured and cracked and had 
subsided, leaving a difference in elevation between the 
city sidewalk and the private walk, with the private 
walk being the higher of the two. 
There is no dispute concerning the fact that the city 
sidewalk was fissured, cracked and weakened at the 
point in question, (Ex. A, B and C). There is also no 
dispute concerning the fact that there was a large eaYity 
under the sidewalk at this point. The cavity was ap-
proximately three feet across and fourteen inches deep, 
(R. 97, 98 and Ex. No. 4). Appellant sustained injuries 
when this section of the city's sidewalk collapsed under 
his right foot, causing him to fall heavily on the pan•-
ment while his foot was still caught in the hole, (H. 40). 
The extent of his injuries is not an issue on appeal. 
Before the matter went to the jury, the eity madt• 
a motion for a directed verdict which t lw court took 
under advisement. The matter was then submitted to 
the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff 
for $1,000.00 special damages, but awardt>d no g-t>w•ral 
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damages. Thereafter, the court granted the motion for 
a directed Yerdict. In Yiew of the fact that the main 
issue on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence to sus-
tain the ,·erdict, we will forego a detailed discussion of 
the evidence here and discuss the evidence in connection 
with the argument. 
SPECIFICATIO~S OF ERROR 
1. The court erred in directing a verdict for the 
defendant in (a) that there was sufficient evidence that 
a dangerous defect existed in Respondent's sidewalk to 
submit the issue of negligence to the jury; (b) there was 
sufficient eYidence that the defect had existed for a long 
enough period of time to constitute notice to the city of 
the defect; and (c) there was sufficient evidence to show 
that the defect of which the city had notice was the 
proximate cause of the injury. 
2. The court erred in refusing to grant a new trial 
in view of the jury's failure to make an award of any 
general damages. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
(a) The jury could reasonably have believed that 
Respondent's walk had subsided and that the 
subsidence had resulted in a substantial difference 
in elevation between the city walk and the private 
walk adjoining on the north. 
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In view of the favorable verdict and the court's 
granting of a directed verdict, plaintiff is entitled to 
the most favorable view of the evidence. Therefore, 
where there was a conflict, only that evidence favorable 
to plaintiff will be noted. There is evidence that the 
walk in the area of the collapse had been in general 
disrepair for many years before November 21, 1 !132, the 
date of the accident. Mr. Smith, Respondent's witness, 
testified there were "quite a number of cracks apparent 
in the concrete", and they had "been there for years", 
(R. 61). Mr. Turner, Respondent's witness, testified that 
there had been no essential change in the condition of 
the walk for six years, (R. 67). He testified particularly 
about a "wide crack", apparent before the collapse, (R. 
66). Mr. Jongejan remembered cracks before the acci-
dent which had been there "ever so long", (R. 70). Ap-
pellant's Exhibits A, B and C are pictures of the general 
area and the hole into which appellant's foot dropped. 
They show a number of cracks around the hole of the 
kind Respondent's witnesses remember as having exi~tPd 
for many years before the accident. Appellant testified 
that the pictures fairly represented the condition, (R. 22). 
The jury could (and since it decided for plaintiff, we 
must assume it did) conclude that, except for tlH: cavity, 
Exhibits A, B and C reflected the condition of the walk 
before the accident. 
Mr. Novak, an engineer, stated definitPly that tlw 
cracks now observable in the city walk and shown ou 
the pictures (Ex. A, Band C) are at least four yparH old. 
He also testified that there was a general slope or decli-
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nation of the surface areas toward and under a patch 
which was placed after the accident in repairing the 
hole, (H . .J2-55). It is obvious from Exhibits A, B and ( ~ 
that when the cracks occurred they permitted or caused 
a general sloping of Respondent's walk on all sides 
toward the point of eventual collapse. 'rhe jury had an 
opportunity to form first-hand impressions about the 
slope of the walk approaching the patch through visiting 
the scene. 
Appellant testified that on the Monday after the 
accident, there were differences in elevation between 
Respondent's walk and the private walk, varying from 
a half inch on one end of the hole to an inch on the other 
end, (R. 24, 25). Plaintiff is corroborated by Exhibits 
A, B and C, which definitely show the slab to the north 
to be higher. Even Exhibit 2, taken at such an angle as 
to minimize it, shows the difference. The differences 
were presumably even greater at the point of maximum 
depression within the section which collapsed, because 
Novak, the engineer, testified that the general slope of 
the area around the hole declined toward the hole, (R. 
52-55). 
The jury could have found that the difference in 
elevation testified to by Appellant existed before the 
accident. First, the pictures taken by Respondent were 
taken only minutes after the accident, (R. 75). They 
show from slightly different angles the exact thing shown 
by Appellant's pictures. In all the pictures a difference 
in elevation can be seen. The crack appears old and 
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there is nothing to indicate a recent change in elevation. 
At the trial counsel for the city showed the pictures to 
the jury and unsuccessfully argued that the pictures 
taken by the city and those offered by the Appellant 
showed that a decided change took place between the 
time the city's pictures and the Appellant's pictures 
were taken. We ask the court to carefully examine the 
pictures. We submit that they are photographs of an 
identical condition. The light down into the hole gives 
prominence to different things, but any close examination 
will reveal that no change took place after the e~ty's 
pictures were taken. The difference in elevation clearly 
appears in Exhibits A and 2. 
Secondly, all of the evidence given was to the effect 
that the cracks were old. Novak said that they were at 
least four years old, (R. 52-55). Mr. Turner said there 
had been no essential change in the walk for six years, 
(R. 67). Mr. Smith said there were a lot of cracks that 
had been there for years, (R. 61). Mr. Jongejan re-
membered cracks that had been there "ever so long", 
(R. 70). Also, attention has already been called to 
Mr. Turner's testimony that before the accident tlwn• 
was a wide crack in the pavement about ''a half inch 
wide or so", (R. 66). He was Respondent's witness and 
he so testified on direct examination. There are only 
two cracks he could have been talking about, the rrark 
marked X-X on Exhibit B, or the one marked Y-Y on 
Exhibit C. He testified that the "half-inrh" erack was 
between two cement blocks (which crack X-X is not) 
and that it was not the crack (X-X) running from the 
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step8 of the apartment house out toward the street. lle 
must, therefore, have been referring to a half-inch crack 
between Respondent's walk and the private walk, (crack 
Y-Y). This, of course, is the crack referred to by Ap-
pellant as causing the difference in elevation. In this 
regard it might also be noted that while the city sought 
to meet this evidence by witnesses who had not noticetl 
any difference in elevation (see Turner's testimony), 
no u.:itness testified that the difference in elevation noted 
by Appellant (R. 24-25) 1cas a recent condition arising 
only after the accident. 
Third, Novak testified concerning the appearance of 
old cracks and how they differed in appearance from 
new cracks. The jury, thus informed, saw the crack in 
question as it sloped downward, (R. 100) into the cement 
patch. The jury also saw the pictures. 
There is thus evidence from which a jury could have 
found that Respondent's walk had subsided many years 
before the accident, resulting in a substantial difference 
in elevation along about two feet of the joinder line be-
tween the city and the private walk. There is credible 
evidence that the difference was as much as an inch on 
one end of the hole and one-half inch on the other, (R. 24-
23). The difference occurred because of a breaking and 
subsidence of the city walk, (R. 52), and not because of 
a defect or elevation of the private walk. 
There are many Utah cases holding that it is a ques-
tion for the jury whether a particular defect in .. a street 
or sidewalk is reasonably safe or dangerous for travel. 
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They are cited and the rule is stated in Ray ·c. Salt Lake 
City, 92 Utah 412, 119 A.L.R. 153. Among them an' 
Jones v. Ogden City, 32 Utah 221; Bills r. Salt Lake Ci(t!, 
37 Utah 507; Robinson v. Salt Lake Oity, 40 Utah -!91. 
and Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306. In Ray r. Salt 
Lake City, Julia A. Ray tripped over a raised portion 
of sidewalk located opposite No. 115 on Kelsey A venue. 
The difference in elevation between the cement sections 
there under consideration varied from 1;4 to ~Is inches. 
This court said : 
"We can not say that the specified difference in 
elevation is so slight that a careful or prudent 
person might not reasonably anticipate danger 
from its existence", and "we think a particular 
defect in a street or sidewalk is reasonably safe 
or dangerous for travel depends not always upon 
the matter of difference of elevation or depres-
sion, but upon all the surrounding circumstances.'' 
What are the surrounding circumstances which may 
be important in determining whether or not a defect is 
dangerous? In Johnson v. City of Ilwaco, 229 P. (2d) 
878, the Washington court, citing Ray v. Salt Lake C'ity, 
supra, and concerning itself with this question said: 
''The exact extent of the offset is not the only 
factor to be considered. The nature and charadt>r 
of the sidewalk, its location, the amount of tran•l 
over it by pedestrians, the extent to whirh its 
presence would ordinarily be seen or obsen·t•d hy 
travelers on the sidewalk, and many other ron-
ditions which might exist, all have to be tnkeu 
into consideration.'' 
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In the case at bar, the defect was located, acconling to 
the stipulation of the parties, (R. 99), near the inter-
section of two of Salt Lake City's busiest streets. It \Yas 
immediately in front of a large apartment house, (Ex. 1). 
There ·was thus constant pedestrian traffic over the 
defeetiYe area. 
Looking at the eYidence in the light most favorable 
to the ... 1\.ppellant, therefore, it is evident that the negli-
gence question is much more definitely for the jury in 
the instant case than it was in the Ray case. There is 
evidence here that the offset was greater than that in 
the Ray case-:Y2 " to 1" here as compared to 14 inch to 
'Vs inch there. The defect was on busy South Temple 
Street near State Street, as compared with Kelsey 
Avenue. It was directly in front of a large apartment. 
The jury reasonably decided that the defect was danger-
ous, and that, in the exercise of ordinary care the Re-
spondent should have repaired it. On the question of 
the existence of a dangerous defect there was evidence 
sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. We next turn 
to the question of notice. 
(b) The existence of the defect for a number of years 
at a location on one of Respondent's busy thor-
oughfares constituted notice to Respondent of the 
defect and its dangerous character. 
One of the main issues presented to the court below 
was the issue of notice to the city of the defect. The city 
took the position that it had to have notice that there 
was a cavity under the sidewalk, and that if it did not 
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have such notice, it was not guilty of negligence. The 
Appellant took the position, and still does, that it was 
not necessary to his recovery that the city have either 
actual or constructive notice of the cavity. The crux of 
the Appellant's case in this regard involves the fact that 
the sidewalk was fissured, cracked and weakened at the 
point where the collapse occurred. There was, as is 
pointed out above, adequate evidence to support the 
jury's verdict to the effect that there was a diffen'nce 
in elevation of up to one inch on one of the cracks aiHl 
that such a difference in elevation on one of the city's 
busiest streets created a dangerous condition. There i~ 
also adequate evidence, as is pointed out above, that 
this dangerous condition had existed for more than four 
years, which under the cases eited below is sufficient iu 
point of time to give the city constructive notice of the 
existence of the crack. We are not contending that one 
can impute notice of one defect from the existence of a 
separate and independent defect. That is not the issue 
involved here. The defect of which the city had notice 
through the passing of time was a crack in the city 
sidewalk. 
The crack in question created a dangerous situation. 
The danger from a broken walk is not confined to trip-
ping. A person may also turn his ankle and fall. HP may 
lose his balance because the broken part tilts. He might 
also have, as happened here, a collapsing of tlw hrokt>Il 
section. Thus the same identical craek which presented 
a patent, visible danger, also caused the sidewalk to be 
weakened and contributed directly to its collapse. It i~. 
10 
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I 
' 
therefore, not a problem of attempting to impute notice 
of one defect from the existence of another. The defect 
here which caused the accident was a substantial crack 
in the sidewalk. This crack existed for over four years 
and the city, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have 
known of its existence. 
The cases are clear that a jury can properly find 
that a city has notice of a defect if it exists on a main, 
heavily travelled street for a substantial period of time. 
In this regard, it is not necessary to go to cases from 
other jurisdictions. The problem has been presented to 
the Utah Supreme Court in many cases. In a recent 
Utah case, Pollari v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 25, 176 P. 
( 2d) 111, this court said : 
"The question of whether the city exercised 
proper vigilence to discover defects depends on 
the element of time, the nature and extent of the 
defect, its prominence in location and other 
factors bearing on what could reasonably be ex-
pected of a reasonably acting person charged with 
the duty of supervising miles of streets and side-
walks. We think under the facts and circum-
stances of this case the question of constructive 
notice was a question for the jury.'' 
In that case the defect had existed for approxi-
mately two years in a residential district of the city and 
was a small hole, "at most five inches by three inches by 
one and one-half inches deep", located on the edge of 
the main walk. In the instant case the defect had existed, 
as the jury could reasonably have found, for twice as 
11 
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long, was at least equally noticeable, and was located 
in an area of heavier pedestrian traffic. 
The problem of notice was also presented to thi" 
court in Scoville v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 60, 39 P. 481, 
wherein the court said: 
''The question of notice to Appellant ·was one of 
fact for the jury to determine, and not a question 
for the court (citing authorities). In Wisconsin 
where a defect in a sidewalk existed one day, awl 
in .Massachusetts, where a defect in a highway 
existed 13 hours, and in Connecticut a few hours 
from frozen water, it was held that it was for t1H.• 
jury to determine whether that constituted suffi-
cient notice (citing cases). This defect and accu-
mulation of ice was on the most travelled walk 
in the city. The question of notice is not alone 
determined from the length of time a defect has 
existed, but was from the nature and character of 
the defect, the extent of the travel, nd whether 
it is in a populous or sparsely settled part of the 
city." 
See also Jones v. Ogden City, 32 Utah 221, 89 P. 
1006, wherein the court quoted from the S('orille raRP 
with approval and held that a defect whith had l:xi~tt·d 
for three days had existed long enough to permit tlw 
case to go to the jury on the issue of notice. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that there 
is evidence from which the jury could ha \'l', and presum-
ably did, find that the walk was generally fissun·d awl 
cracked, and that these cracks had existed for more than 
four years. The jury also could have, and presumably 
12 
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did, find that the crack which presented this difference 
in elevation also was one of the main cracks which caused 
the weakening of the sidewalk permitting a collapse. It 
is respectfully submitted that the general fissuring, 
cracking and subsidence which resulted in a difference 
in eleYation of up to one inch and also caused a weaken-
ing of the sidewalk would support the jury's verdict as 
to the existence of a defect. The evidence that the defect 
had existed on a busy street for over four years would 
support the jury's verdict as to the issue of notice. Per-
mitting a defect of this kind to exist four years or more 
is, under the cases, sufficient to support a jury verdict 
on the issue of negligence. The next issue relates to 
proximate causation. 
POINT NO. II. IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO THE 
DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE THAT 
RESPONDENT'S NEGLIGENCE BE THE SOLE 
CAUSE, OR THAT APPELLANT'S INJURY 
OCCUR IN A MANNER WHICH MIGHT HAVE 
BEEN FORESEEN OR ANTICIPATED. 
The record does not reflect the trial judge's reasons 
for directing a verdict. We believe, however, that he did 
so because the cavity was one of the causes of the side-
walk collapse, and there was little to indicate on the 
surface that the cavity existed. We confess that the 
cavity was one of the causes. We also confess that were 
the cavity the sole cause, we could only recover by show-
ing that the city knew or should have known that the 
cavity existed. Here, however, the cavity was only one 
13 
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of t'wo ca·uses-the other being the cracking and fissuring 
of the cement. 
The city had notice of the dangerous crack. Its 
greatest danger was that it might cause people to trip 
and fall. But it was not necessary that a crack cause the 
injury only by tripping. The sidewalk failed along this 
very crack. The city would no\Y escape liability, because 
the crack caused a fall through a collapse of the sidr-
walk, instead of by tripping tl1e Appellant. The nrgli-
gence of the city is in permitting this crack to go lmrr-
paired for four years. This unrepaired crack was mw 
of the main and direct causes of the sidewalk failure. 
The cavity was not the sole cause. By itself it would 
never have caused the injury. Cement in proper repair 
will support the weight of a man walking normally down 
the street. So long as the cement remains firm and un-
broken, it will not collapse even though there is a four-
teen inch cavity under it. It is thus fundamentally wrong 
to say that the cavity was the only cause of the collapSL'. 
It was the fissuring and cracking which weakened the 
cement so that it would not support the weight of a 
pedestrian. Apparently the cavity itself was old. The 
cement had supported the traffic "·ithout breaking. The 
immediate cause of the collapse "·as the cracking of thr 
cement. 
The law has always been that the negligence of the 
defendant need be only one of the con<'urring or <'Oll-
tributing causes. It is not necessary for us to show thnt 
the cracking and fissuring of the sidewalk was the sole 
14 
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cause of the injury. In the Yery recent Utah case, Char-
coz v. Bonnerille Irrigation District, 235 P. (2d) 780, 
the trial court instructed the jury that if an act of God 
be the primary cause of damage, there could be no re-
covery, irrespectiYe of negligence that may have con-
eurred with it in producing damage. The court held that 
this instruction was erroneous, that it is well settled 
that one is aecountable if his negligence concurs with an 
act of God or with the negligence of a stranger in effect-
ing damage. Here the cavity which was caused by 
persons or reasons unknown concurred with the fissuring, 
cracking and weakening of the sidewalk in causing the 
plaintiff to fall. This proposition that the negligence of 
the defendant need not be the sole cause is uniformly 
recognized by the cases. See, for a general text state-
ment, 38 Am. Jur. 715, Negligence, Section 63. 
The conclusion is thus unescapable. The city was 
negligent, because it permitted the cracked sidewalk to 
go unrepaired on one of the city's busiest streets for 
over four years. This unrepaired crack weakened the 
cement so that it would not support the weight of the 
appellant. This weakening, (added to the cavity) caused 
the walk to collapse. It was certainly one of the direct, 
contributing causes of the injury. Therefore, negligence 
r and proximate cause were shown, and the verdict of the 
jury should have been sustained. 
The cases, we believe, fully sustain our position that 
it is not necessary that the city be able to foresee the 
exact manner in which this dangerous, long-existing 
15 
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crack would cause injury. It is only necessary that the 
city be able to foresee that this crack would in some 
manner cause injury. Respondent can cite many cases 
to the effect that a collapse in a walk where nothing 
about the surface of the walk suggests the possibility 
of injury is not actionable. None of the cases cited in 
the court below by Respondent or found by us in research 
is a case where there did exist on the surface at the 
point of collapse a visible defect which was dangerouR 
and which also contributed to the collapse. It is Appel-
lant's position that, once Respondent's negligence has 
been established, Respondent is liable for all injuries 
directly attributable to its negligence whether or not the 
manner of injury was to any extent foreseeable. 
A very distinct variance in the approach to legal 
cause is evident in the cases and among the writers. 
Some say foreseeability of harm should be considered 
only in determining whether the defendant was negligent 
with reference to the plaintiff. Others say liability should 
be limited, even where negligence is proven, to those 
consequences which are to some degree foreseeabh•. A 
landmark case illustrating the first approarh is In ](,. 
Polemis and Furness & Co., (1921 (1.A.) 3 KB 560, 90 
LJKB 1353. It there appeared that charterers of a ship 
were carrying, among other things, a quantity of petrol. 
There had been some leakage so that there were fumes 
in the ship's hold. In removing the petrol a plank was 
negligently knocked into the hold, and a resultant Rpark 
destroyed the ship. It was found that sparking could not 
reasonably have been anticipated under the rircum-
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stances, although some damage could have been. In 
affirming an award, the court said: 
'• \Yhat a defendant ought to have anticipated as 
a reasonable man is material when the question 
was whether or not he was guilty of want of due 
care under the circumstances .... Given the 
breach of duty which constitutes the negligence 
and given the damage as a direct result of that 
negligence, the anticipations of the person whose 
negligent act has produced the damage appear 
to me irrelevant.'' 
.Jiany English and American cases state the Polem·is 
view, and it is supported by a formidable group of text 
writers.1 Enough heat has been generated about the 
problem so that arguments are frequently stated. Pro-
fessor F. H. Bohlen, 40 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 80, says: 
"It may be hard to mulct the wrongdoer in 
damages for results which the normal man would 
not anticipate, but it is more unjust that the 
person injured by the breach of duty imposed for 
his protection should not recover for all the loss 
which has, in the ordinary course of nature, been 
caused him by the wrong because the wrongdoer 
could not foresee the full effect of his act.'' 
Jeremiah Smith thoroughly considered the problem 
and pointed up the injustice of making foreseeability an 
element of legal cause in three Harvard Law Review 
articles (Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 H.L.R. 103, 
223, 303). Among his statements are: 
1 Street Foundations of Legal Liability 116; 1 Bevan on Negligence 
(Third Edition) 88-90; Jeremiah Smith, as quoted; F. H. Bohlen, 
as quoted. 
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"In the first place, it is not the law that, to 
constitute an action negligent the connection must 
be such that a particular injury could have been 
foreseen. If injury in some form would be the 
natural sequence of the negligence, the party 
guilty of the negligence is warned of the danger 
of his course, and that is all the warning to whieh 
he is entitled under the law.'' Ill. Central v. 
Creighton, 63 Ill. App. 165. 
''The test is whether eonditions which lead to an 
extraordinary or even unprecedented accident 
were such that no reasonably prudent proprietor 
would have suffered to exist. The particular 
manifestations of the result of careless conditions 
is not infrequently quite out of the usual experi-
ence, but if the conditions possess elements of 
negligence, the person responsible for them may 
also be held responsible for the result.'' Dulligan 
v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company, 87 N.E. 567. 
Most jurisdictions in the United States have adoptL•d 
one view or the other with reference to the legal cnu:-;P 
controversy. The Utah court made its position very 
clear in the case of Stone v. Railroad, 32 Utah 185, 89 P. 
715. In that case the Union Pacific Railroad had operated 
a freight engine from which steam was escaping in s1wh 
quantities as to obscure the vision of the engineer. 
Because of the steam and the fact that the enginN•r wns 
mis-informed that a passenger train travelling in tlw 
opposite direction would be an hour and 50 miuutt•:-; la t L'l, 
a collision occurred. The court admitted that tlw jury 
could have found that an injury of the kind whieh ditl 
occur (collision with another train) was a foreseeable 
consequence of the defendant's Ht•nding a tlef'Petive 
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l'HgiHL', but it did not place its decision on that ground. 
\Yhether or not collision with another train could have 
been anicipated, injury of some kind was foreseeable if 
such an engine (leaking steam) were allowed to operate. 
The court said at page 205 : 
"If the act is one which the party in the exercise 
of ordinary care could have anticipated as likely 
to result in injury, then he is liable for any injury 
actually resulting from it, although he could not 
have anticipated the particular injury whieh did 
occur.'' 
This statement, so definitely an adoption of the view of 
Bohlen, Smith, etc., has been repeated by the Utah court 
in lVilcox v. TVunderlich, 272 P. 215; Hess v. Robinson, 
163 P. (2d) 510, and Fttrkovich v. Bingha,m Coal and 
Lumber, 143 P. 121. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the jury 
could have and did find that the city permitted a crack 
to exist for four years or more; that the crack presented 
a difference in elevation of up to one inch; that such a 
difference in elevation was dangerous to pedestrians ; 
that this same identical crack caused the sidewalk to be 
weak and incapable of supporting the weight of a pedes-
trian; that because of this crack the sidewalk collapsed, 
r causing the plaintiff to suffer injuries. It clearly is not 
important that there was another contributing cause (the 
cavity) which the city could not see from the surface. 
It is not necessary in tort law that the city's negligence 
be the sole cause. Here the unrepaired crack was one 
of the direct and proximate causes. The Ray v. Salt Lake 
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City case squarely held that a difference in elevation less 
than that involved here on a street less heavily travelled, 
created a condition which the jury could properly find 
was dangerous and negligent. In the Pollari case and 
the other cases cited above, this court held that defects 
existing from three days to two years have existed for 
a sufficient length of time to permit a jury to find that 
the city was negligent in not discovering them. 
It is clear also from the cases that it is not necessary 
that the unrepaired crack should cause injury only by 
tripping. This crack caused the sidewalk to become 
weakened and to collapse. Negligence and proximate 
causation were proved and the jury resolved the issues 
on negligence, notice and causation in plaintiff's favor. 
The verdict should have been allowed to stand. 
POINT NO. III. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE 
JURY IMPROPERLY RENDERED ITS VER-
DICT AWARDING SPECIAL DAMAGES WITH-
OUT ANY AWARD FOR GENERAL DAMAGgs. 
A verdict was returned by the jury in the amount 
of $1,000.00 designated special damages. ~rhP evidence 
clearly sustains an award of special damages in the 
amount of $1,000.00. Appellant's loss of earnings alone 
amounted to $1050.00. No award for general damages 
was made. The uncontradicted evidence shows that 
Appellant suffered painful injuries, was confined to hi~ 
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bed for a period of time and thereafter had continuing 
pain and inconvenience. He is entitled to an award of 
some general damages. Appellant, therefore, requests 
the court to reverse the order directing a verdict against 
plaintiff; to enter an order re-establishing the award of 
special damages in the amount of $1,000.00 and permit-
ting a new trial on the question of general damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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